Freedom of Religion as a Defense to a #1981 Action against a Racially Discriminatory Private School by McLaughlin, Mark
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 53 | Issue 1 Article 7
10-1-1977
Freedom of Religion as a Defense to a #1981
Action against a Racially Discriminatory Private
School
Mark McLaughlin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark McLaughlin, Freedom of Religion as a Defense to a #1981 Action against a Racially Discriminatory Private School, 53 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 107 (1977).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol53/iss1/7
FREEDOM OF RELIGION AS A DEFENSE TO A § 1981 ACTION
AGAINST A RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY PRIVATE SCHOOL
I. Introduction
42 U.S.C. § 1981' guarantees to all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States the equal right to enter into contracts. In a 1976 decision, Runyon
v. McCrary,' the Supreme Court held that this provision afforded a remedy
against two private schools which had discriminated against applicants on the
basis of race. In Runyon, the parents of two black children had attempted
to contract with the schools for the provision of educational services to these
children, and were turned away solely because of race. According to the Court,
§ 1981 proscribed this act of discrimination.
The Court emphasized, however, that the scope of its ruling was limited.
The case did not establish a precedent automatically applicable to the admissions
policies of all private schools. The holding was limited to "private, commercially
operated, nonsectarian schools."' In particular, the Runyon Court stressed that
religion had not been a factor in the actions of either of the schools involved in
the litigation.' In reserving this issue, the Court suggested two ways in which it
might arise in § 1981 cases. First, a private school might claim that the exclusion
of applicants was based upon the children's religion rather than their race.' A
school might also raise the religious issue by admitting that its policy of exclusion
was based upon the race of the applicant, but claim that this action was moti-
vated by religious belief.6 The absence in Runyon of either of these claims
enabled the Supreme Court to proclaim that "the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment is thus in no way here involved."7
This note examines the second of the two claims specifically reserved by the
Court in Runyon. The precise issue is whether a private school which, because of
the religious beliefs of its operators, refuses to admit black students, is immune
from a § 1981 suit under a free exercise of religion theory. The interjection of
this constitutional claim brings into play one of the fundamental freedoms pro-
tected by the Bill of Rights. The complications are apparent in a hypothetical §
1981 suit in which parents claim that their offer to a private school to contract
for the education of their child has been rejected solely because of race and the
school responds that the racial discrimination was motivated by religious belief.'
1 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."
2 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
3 427 U.S. at 168.
4 Id. at 167.
5 Id. The Court added that exclusion based .on the religious faith of the child would be
immune from inquiry under § 1981, since that statute "is in no way addressed to such cate-
gories of selectivity." Id. This type of admission policy is not the subject of this note.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 167 n.6.
8 This note will refer on occasion to this hypothetical case, which provides the basis for
the discussion in this note.
The recent Supreme Court cases which have discussed § 1981 have mainly involved dis-
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II. Applicability of § 1981
42 U.S.C. § 1981 grants all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States the right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts.'
In Runyon v. McCrary the Supreme Court held that this statute prohibited the
private schools involved from discriminating among applicants for admission on
the basis of race. In other words, § 1981 was applied to contracts for the pro-
vision of "educational services."' While Runyon was the first Supreme Court
case dealing with § 1981 in which this particular type of conduct was involved,
it is but one of a line of recent cases in which § 1981, -and its companion, §
1982,11 have been employed to remedy private acts of discrimination.
The 1968 decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v. Mayer Co.'2 initiated
this trend. In Jones, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had refused to sell
him a home solely because the plantiff was black. The claim for relief was
premised on § 1982, which by its terms guarantees to all "citizens ... the same
right... as is enjoyed by white citizens... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property."' The Court concluded that this statute
prohibits the sort of private discrimination alleged by the plaintiff.'" The Court
reached this result after an extensive review of the legislative history of § 1982,
which derives from the same statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as § 1981.15
The Court construed this common ancestor of § 1981 and § 1982 as an attempt
by Congress to eradicate both public and private- discrimination and thus to give
substance to the guarantee of freedom contained in the thirteenth amendment.'6
The Jones Court further concluded that this exercise of legislative power
over private action was valid in light of the provision in the thirteenth amend-
ment enabling Congress "to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."' 7 In
the words of the Court:
Surely Congress had the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally
to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the
authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.'8
crimination by whites against blacks. The discussion in these cases, and in this note, does seem
most immediately applicable to such discriminaton. However, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), the Supreme Court held that § 1981 afforded a remedy
to white men who had suffered from racial discrimination in their contractual relationship
with a private employer. Presumably, the Runyon rationale would apply to a private school
which discriminated against white applicants. If such a school advanced a first amendment
defense to a § 1981 suit, the problems discussed in this note would arise.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
10 427 U.S. at 172.
11 42 U.S.C. § 1982 '(1970). "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right,
in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
As will be seen, both § 1981 and § 1982 derive from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 14
Stat. 27 (1866). See discussion in Runyon, 427 U.S. at 170.
12 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
13 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), cited in Jones, 392 U.S. at 412.
14 The court of appeals in Jones had held that § 1982 reaches only state action. 392 U.S.
at 412-13.
15 Id. at 422.
16 Id. at 413, 433. The thirteenth amendment states that "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1.
17 Id. at 438 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, § 2).
18 392 U.S. at 440.
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Thus, § 1982, by providing relief from private discrimination encountered in the
attempt to purchase property, constitutes a valid implementation of the constitu-
tional mandate to root out the badges and incidents of slavery.
While this holding dealt directly with § 1982, the interpretation given the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 by the Jones Court clearly in-
dicated that the Court would apply § 1981 to private conduct if the proper case
arose. In Tillman u. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 9 the Court noted the
"historical interrelationship" between § 1981 and § 1982 and appeared to
assume, without discussion, that both sections would reach state and private
action."0 Finally, in its 1975 decision in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency," the
Court explicitly held that § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination by private
persons in the termination of private employment contracts. 2
These decisions provided the basis for the Court's decision in Runyon
justifying the utilization of § 1981 as a remedy for racial discrimination in the
formation of contracts for private school education. After a discussion of Jones,
Tillman, and Johnson, the Court concluded that the conduct of the two de-
fendant private schools constituted a "classic violation" of § 1981. The plaintiffs
had attempted to enter into a contractual relationship with the schools, which
advertised to the general public, and were rebuffed solely because of race. Under
such circumstances, according to the Court, a deqision that § 1981 had been
violated "follows inexorably from the language of that statute ...
That was not, however, the end of the Court's analysis in Runyon. Although
the defendants did not interpose a free exercise of religion claim, the schools did
contend that the application of § 1981 would implicate certain constitutional
rights of the parents of children attending these schools. Specifically, the de-
fendants claimed that the constitutional protection accorded freedom of associa-
tion, parental rights, and the right of privacy shielded them from liability under
§ 1981.24
Initially, the schools argued that abridgement of the exclusionary policies of
the schools would infringe the freedom of association constitutionally guaranteed
to the parents of children attending private schools.2" The Court rejected this
contention. It concluded that although freedom of association protects the rights
of parents to enroll their children in schools that advance the belief that segrega-
tion of the races is beneficial, it is not a license for such schools to practice that
belief. Consequently, § 1981 curbs this practice without infringing the first
amendment freedom.2
The schools further alleged that the "parental right" to raise children and
to direct their education would be violated by the application of § 1981 to the
19 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
20 Id. at 440.
21 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
22 Id. at 459-60.
23 427 U.S. at 172-73.
24 Id. at 175.
25 The Court noted that, since its decision in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958), "the Court has recognized a First Amendment right to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas. . . ." 427 U.S. at 175 (quoting 357 U.S. at 460). The
Runyon Court "assumed" that this right gave the parents a right to enroll their children in
schools which advocate racial discrimination. 427 U.S. at 176.
26 427 U.S. at 176.
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facts before the Court. The right to educate children in private schools has been
recognized as an aspect of the "liberty" that is constitutionally protected against
government infringement." However, the Runyon Court also rejected this argu-
ment, on grounds similar to those used to dispose of the defendants' earlier claim.
Application of § 1981 to this situation did not derogate the right of any parent to
send a child to a particular private school, nor did it restrict the teaching of any
particular subject matter or belief. Thus, according to the Court, no claim of
"parental right" was available to block this application of § 1981."
To complete its analysis of possible constitutional claims, the Court dealt
with the notion that the right of privacy is involved in a parental decision to
educate a child at a private school that practices racial exclusion.29 Finding this
privacy claim to be virtually indistinguishable from the parental right it had
already dismissed, the Court disposed of the claim in a similar manner. It noted
that the two rights "may be no more than verbal variations of a single constitu-
tional right,""0 and concluded that parents "have no constitutional right to
provide their children with private school education unfettered by reasonable
government regulation."'"
Thus, in Runyon v. McCrary § 1981 was held applicable to private schools
which discriminate among applicants on the basis of race. The Court employed
the precedent provided in its prior cases to support its conclusion that § 1981,
on its face, applied to the conduct in question. Furthermore, it rejected the con-
tention that application of the statute in this particular situation would result in
an unconstitutional deprivation of the defendants' protected rights. According
to the Court's analysis, no constitutional guarantee would be abridged by a judg-
ment under § 1981 in favor of the plaintiffs.
It is not clear whether the result would be the same if the constitutional
claim were different. In particular, a free exercise of religion defense would
inject a new dimension into the litigation. The issue of whether a private school's
racially exclusionary policy, motivated by religious belief, can withstand attack
under § 1981 thus remains open.
III. Free Exercise of Religion Guidelines
A. Development of the Compelling Interest Test
The Supreme Court has frequently confronted the claim that certain laws
or other government action violated the protection accorded by the constitution
27 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923). These cases involved state governments, so that the "liberty" involved was that which
is protected against state action by the fourteenth amendment. In Runyon, a federal statute
was involved. The claimed "parental right" would therefore apparently derive from the fifth
amendment, which protects against federal infringement of "liberty."
28 427 U.S. at 176-77.,
29 The Court noted that past cases have established that "in some situations" privacy is a
constitutionally protected right. It realized that application of § 1981 in Runyon would not
represent government intrusion into the privacy of the home. However, the "parental interests"
present in Runyon were closely related to the "procreative rights" which the Court in prior
cases had protected under the privacy rationale. Id. at 177-78.
30 Id. at 178 n.15.
31 Id. at 178.
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to the free exercise of religion. The standards that have evolved through this
line of cases must serve as the guidelines in any inquiry into the validity of this
first amendment defense to a § 1981 suit based on a private school's racially
discriminatory policy.
Early cases in which actions grounded in religious belief came into conflict
with government-imposed restrictions on conduct concerned the practice of
polygamy by Mormons. In Reynolds v. United States,2 the defendant had been
convicted of bigamy in the Territory of Utah. The Supreme Court rejected
Reynolds' claim that, because his actions were motivated by religious belief, he
was immune from prosecution. The defendant contended that, as a Mormon,
he was required to practice polygamy to avoid "damnation in the life to come."3 "
The Court did not dispute the sincerity of this claim, but nevertheless concluded
that nothing in the first amendment prohibited Congress, in the exercise of its
authority over the territory, from totally proscribing this practice. With the
passage of the first amendment, according to the Court, "Congress was deprived
of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which
were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." 4 Having estab-
lished this dichotomy between belief and action, the Court noted that polygamy
was, indeed, uniformly regarded in Western civilization as a social evil." Given
these circumstances, the Court found it "impossible to believe that the constitu-
tional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect
to this most important feature of social life. 9
In Davis v. Beason," another early case dealing with the Mormon religion,"
the Court reiterated its conclusion that the state has the power to reach certain
actions regardless of their close connection with religious belief. The Davis Court
described the scope of the religious freedom protected by the first amendment as
follows:
It was never intended or supposed that the amendment could be invoked as
a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the
peace, good order and morals of society. With man's relation to his Maker
and the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in which an
expression shall be made by him of his belief on these subjects, no interfer-
ence can be permitted,.provided always the laws of society, designed to secure
its peace and prosperity, and the morals of its people, are not interfered
with.3 9
The Supreme Court in Davis thus acknowledged the power of the trial court to
32 98 U.S. 145 '(1878).
33 Id. at 161 (quoting the trial record).
34 Id. at 164.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 165.
37 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
38 Davis did not involve a polygamy prosecution. Idaho territorial law required a person
registering to vote to swear to the fact that he was not a polygamist, did not belong to a body
which practiced or advocated polygamy, and would not in the future counsel anyone to practice
it. Davis, a Mormon, took the oath, and was prosecuted with others for a conspiracy to ob-
struct the due administration of territorial law. Id. at 334-35. In a habeas corpus proceeding,
the Supreme Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the trial court over the matter. Id. at 341.
39 Id. at 342.
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enforce the statute despite the alleged infringement of religious freedom."
In the years following these decisions, the Supreme Court had other op-
portunities to explain the limits of religious freedom. In Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut,4 for example, the Court further developed the dichotomy, first expressed in
Reynolds, between belief and action. According to the Cantwell Court, the
first amendment safeguards both freedom of belief and of action. Differences
emerge, however, in the degree of protection accorded each: freedom to believe
is "absolute," whereas all conduct "remains subject to regulation for the protec-
tion of society."42 The Court was careful to point out that this power over
actions must be exercised with restraint, in order not "unduly to infringe the
protected freedom."4
At issue in Cantwell was a state law requiring any person intending to
solicit for religious purposes to acquire a permit; before granting such a permit,
a state official was required to determine whether the purpose was, in fact,
religious. Cantwell, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, had been convicted
of soliciting without a permit. The Court recognized that a state, in order to
further its interest in the "peace, good order and comfort of the com-
munity . . . " may to some extent regulate solicitation, even where this solicita-
tion purports to aid religion. For example, control of the time and manner of
such solicitation would be permissible."
The statute in Cantwell, however, went far beyond this. It authorized an
official to determine that a particular case was not truly religious, and thus to
refuse to issue a solicitation permit. Such an action, according to the Court,
constituted an impermissible censorship of religion, violative of the freedom to
act protected by the first amendment's free exercise of religion clause.46
The interest of the state in legislating for the public welfare also clashed
with the right of the Jehovah's Witnesses to exercise their religion in Prince v.
Massachusetts." The state law involved in this case prohibited children from
selling literature of any kind in public places. The statute also provided for
punishment of any parent or custodian who permitted a child to violate the act.4"
A member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the aunt and custodian of a girl who had
sold religious tracts on the street, was convicted under the statute, despite
evidence that members of the sect believe that the Bible compels children to
preach the faith in this manner."
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction because of the important state
40 See note 38 supra. In a final case dealing with the practice of polygamy as an exercise
of religious belief, the Supreme Court in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946),
affirmed the conviction of a Fundamentalist Mormon for a violation of the Mann Act.
41 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
42 Id. at 303-04.
43 Id. at 304.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 306-07.
46 Id. at 305. Since this was a state law, the first amendment freedom was not applicable
directly, but rather was applied through the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of "liberty." Id.
47 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
48 Id. at 160-01.
49 Id. at 162-64.
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interests advanced by the statute.5" The court noted that society at large has a
vital interest in the "welfare of children."'" To protect that welfare, the govern-
ment may in many instances regulate the conduct of children, even over parental
and religious objections. In the words of the Court, "A democratic society rests,
for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding
restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection."5
The state in Prince apparently decided that the development of children was
endangered by this religious activity in public places. According to the Court, the
state on this ground could validly restrict the harmful practice without violating
the constitution."
Two more recent Supreme Court decisions continued this case-by-case
process of resolving conflicts between state interests and the right to act accord-
ing to the dictates of one's religion. These two cases, Sherbert v. Verner' and
Wisconsin v. Yoder,55 summarize and consolidate the principles developed in the
cases previously discussed, and thus provide guidelines useful in any analysis of
the validity of an exercise of religion defense against a § 1981 action.
In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied unemployment compen-
sation by the state because she refused to accept employment which would have
required her to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. The Supreme Court accepted
her claim that this deprivation violated her right to exercise her religion.56 The
Court undertook an analysis of free exercise cases, in which it noted that many
state restrictions of "overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles" had
in the past been upheld against such constitutional challenge. Citing cases such as
Reynolds and Prince, the Court concluded that the proscribed actions "have
invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order."5'
According to the Sherbert Court, there remains a second category of cases
in which the state may legitimately burden the exercise of religion even in the
absence of an overt threat to public safety. These cases involve the existence of
a "compelling state interest."5 Not only must the state prove the need for pro-
tection of such an interest, but it must also "demonstrate that no alternative forms
of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment
rights."5 9 When a state fails to meet this burden, the individual's freedom to
exercise his religion must prevail. The Court concluded that Sherbert fell within
this second category, and that the state had not overcome its burden."
The freedom of religion claim also triumphed over the asserted state interest
50 Two areas of constitutional protection were claimed. A first amendment defense was
supported by a claim that the aunt had constitutionally significant "parental right" to rear
the child in the way that she chose. Id. at 164. The Court did not analyze the claims separate-
ly, but treated the argument as a whole.
51 Id. at 165.
52 Id. at 168.
53 Id. at 170-71.
54 374- U.S. 398 (1963).
55 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
56 374 U.S. at 399-402.
57 Id. at 403.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 406-07.
60 Id. at 408-09.
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in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 1 In Yoder the state attempted to apply to members of
the Amish faith its statute requiring children to attend school until the age of
sixteen. The Amish defendants claimed that compulsory school attendance
beyond the eighth grade unduly restricted the practice of their religious belief that
secular education beyond that point irreparably harms the spiritual development
of an Amish child.6" The Supreme Court agreed that this constitutional claim
exempted the Amish from prosecution under the compulsory education law."3
The Court began its analysis by expressing the familiar principle that
freedom of religious activity is not absolute. Such practices "are often subject to
regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the
health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of
its delegated powers." 4 The Court cautioned, however, against the facile con-
clusion that every time "action" as opposed to "belief" is involved, the state regu-
lation will prevail. According to the Court, much conduct motivated by religious
belief will be shielded from governmental interference. Furthermore, the Court
emphasized that drawing a distinction between belief and action is not par-
ticularly valuable in resolving free exercise claims. The Court concluded that the
competing claims require a more exacting analysis than this mechanical exercise
provides.6"
In describing the analysis that must take place, the Supreme Court in Yoder,
unlike the Sherbert Court, did not differentiate between religious practices which
pose a threat to public order and practices, such as the refusal to work on
Saturday, which are more innocuous in nature. Rather, the Court summarized
in one sentence the standard which must be applied to determine whether a
state restriction on any religious practice will be valid: "The essence of all that
has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the
free exercise of religion."
'66
This determination of whether a particular regulation safeguards a compel-
ling state interest, and of whether less restrictive means of protecting this interest
exist, cannot be accomplished by the mere acknowledgement of broad state
powers over some general sphere of conduct. Rather, a Court must "searchingly
examine" the claimed state interest and examine the extent to which the state's
aims will be thwarted by granting the relief demanded by the religious ad-
herents.6"
61 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
62 Id. at 215-19.
63 Id. at 207.
64 Id. at 220.
65 Id. In the words of the Court, "in this context belief and action cannot be neatly con-
fined in logic-tight compartments."
66 Id. at 215.
67 Id. at 221. As noted in the text, when the Supreme Court applied these principles it
determined that the constitutional claim of the Amish should prevail. The Court acknowledged
that the state has a valid interest in ensuring the education of children. The Court agreed with
the state that the goals of the educational system are two-fold; education prepares the children
1) to participate in our "open political system," and 2) to "be self-reliant and self-sufficient
participants in society." Id. The Court concluded that, for the Amish, compulsory education
until the age of sixteen is not necessary to accomplish these goals. The Court observed that
the Amish did attend public school through the eighth grade. It also stressed that, beyond that
point, the Amish were not opposed to all education. To support its analysis, the Court cited
[October 1977]
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Thus, the Court in Yoder, as a further step in the development of the prec-
edent provided by cases such as-Reynolds, Davis, Cantwell, Prince, and Sherbert,
articulated some basic principles to apply in any attempt to determine the validity
of government action that allegedly abridges the free exercise of religion. A court
would be required to adhere to these principles in any inquiry into the ap-
plicability of § 1981 to private schools that racially discriminate on the basis of
religious belief. The Court in Yoder, however, also raised another issue that is
pertinent to the subject of this note. The problem that this issue raises is delicate
in itself, but in some cases straightforward confrontation of it would allow a court
to avoid the agonizing task of resolving the conflict between a strong state interest
and a basic constitutional freedom. This potential method of disposition involves
an inquiry into whether the allegedly protected practice is, in fact, motivated by
religious principles or whether it is simply based on secular values.
B. Screening Spurious First Amendment Claims
The Yoder Court confronted this preliminary dilemma: it had to determine
whether the defendants' way of life, for which the Amish claimed constitutional
protection, was truly "inseparable" from their faith.6" If it were not, the Amish
would not have the right to the protections accorded religious practices. In the
words of the Court: "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not
be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based
on purely secular considerations. . ."" While the Court acknowledged that
the distinction between secular and religious motivation would be difficult to
draw, it concluded that the determination was necessary lest idiosyncratic per-
sonal preferences be allowed to reign unrestricted in "matters of conduct in which
society as a whole has important interests."7
The use of such a, test is a valuable aid in forestalling spurious claims to first
amendment safeguards. If a court automatically applied the rigid constitutional
standard without screening out such claims, the challenged governmental actions
would be subjected to unnecessarily severe scrutiny. In Yoder the Court had to
undertake a rigorous analysis using traditional free exercise principles, since it
concluded that the practices of the Amish were rooted in religious considera-
evidence of a successful pattern among the Amish of "learning-by-doing." Id. at 223. Accord-
ing to the Court, children brought up in this tradition have invariably become "productive and
law-abiding members of society." Id. at 222. The Amish have functioned efficiently for genera-
tions under this system. Even if an Amish child should eventually decide to reject the life
style of his ancestors and adopt more conventional ways, he would not necessarily become a
burden on society simply because his- formal education was two years shorter than that of
other children. Indeed, the Court suggests that this result is unlikely in view of the "Amish
qualities of reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work." Id. at 224.
Finally, the Court noted that compulsory education laws are historically related to the
movement to eradicate child labor. While the evils of child labor obviously constitute a proper
object of state concern, the Amish are not likely to abuse an exemption from the compulsory
education law. Amish children do work, but the labor takes place on the family farm under
parental supervision. Id. at 229. Given this combination of circumstances, the Court concluded
that the state interest was not so imperilled by this exercise of religious principles as to justify
a limitation on the practice.
68 Id. at 215.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 215-16. The Yoder Court went on from here to conclude that the Amish way of
life was motivated by their religious beliefs. Id. at 216-19.
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tions.7 ' Even before Yoder, however, a Federal judge had applied this prelimi-
nary screening test to reject a claim of immunity from prosecution based on the
free exercise of religion clause.
In United States v. Kuch,7 ' the defendant in a narcotics prosecution claimed
that the Neo-American Church, of which she was an ordained minister, regarded
the use of certain drugs as a sacrament. As a church member, the defendant
asserted, she was under a religious duty to participate in this activity. Conse-
quently, it was alleged that punishment by the state under these circumstances
would infringe her right to exercise her religious beliefs.73
Rather than immediately undertake an assessment of the state interest in-
volved in Kuch, the court began with a discussion of whether the conduct was in
fact based on religious belief. The judge recognized that this was "a matter of
delicacy"; he also recognized, however, that he could not avoid the issue. He
supported this decision as follows:
Those who seek the constitutional protections for their participation in an
establishment of religion and freedom to practice its beliefs must not be
permitted the special freedoms this sanctuary may provide merely by adopt-
ing religious nomenclature and cynically using it as a shield to protect them
when participating in antisocial conduct that otherwise stands condemned.
7 4
An examination of the literature and other accoutrements of the Neo-American
Church persuaded the court that the sole raison d'etre of this group was "the
desire to use drugs and to enjoy them for their own sake, regardless of religious
experience."'7  Such a motivation for the conduct at issue, concluded the court,
was insufficient to warrant the invocation of first amendment safeguards."6
Kuch thus provides an example of the type of inquiry which might be thrust
upon a court faced with a freedom of religion defense to a suit against a private
school with racially discriminatory admissions policies. Yoder and Kuch teach
that it will not always be necessary to treat this conflict as a confrontation
71 Id. at 216-19.
72 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968).
73 Id. at 442-43.
74 Id. at 443.
75 Id. at 444.
76 Despite this analysis, the court refused to rest its decision on these grounds. It assumed
arguendo that the religious claim was valid, and rejected the defendant's contention using the
traditional free exercises guidelines. Id. at 445.
The analysis employed by the court in Kuch and by the Yoder Court must be distin-
guished from the sort of. analysis which was held as constitutionally impermissible by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). There, in reviewing a convic-
tion for using the mails to defraud, the Court concluded that the first amendment forbids a
judge or jury from inquiring into the truth or falsity of any religious belief. Quoting an early
Supreme Court case, the Court noted that "[The law knows no heresy, and is committed to
the support of no dogma." 322 U.S. at 86 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,
728 (1871)).
Determining that a particular religious belief is true or false is clearly not the same as
deciding whether or not it is religious belief that motivates particular conduct. In a § 1981
case to which a freedom of religion defense was interposed, a court could not, under Ballard,
decide that segregation is not biblically ordained. It could, however, analyze the defendant's
claim and decide that it was rooted solely in secular considerations.
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between a fundamental constitutional freedom and a valid state interest.7 7 It
might be possible to foreclose such a dilemma by determining that the discrimina-
tory practice was not motivated by religious considerations. The courts that have
undertaken this task have realized that this inquiry in itself requires extreme
caution, lest courts "permit their own moral and ethical standards to determine
the religious implications of beliefs and practices of others.1 78 The district court
in Kuch was willing to shoulder this burden to dispose of a frivolous claim to first
amendment protection. A similar court in the hypothetical § 1981 suit might find
it necessary to engage in the same analysis. If it were to conclude that the
practice of segregation of the races was motivated by religious considerations, a
further analysis, under the traditional free exercise guidelines, would be war-
ranted. On the other hand, if the court were to decide that secular values under-
pinned the challenged practice, Runyon would control and the necessity of a
painstaking first amendment analysis would thereby be avoided."
IV. Applying the First Amendment Test
If the racially discriminatory admissions policy of a private school were in
fact motivated by religious belief, a court dealing with a § 1981 suit based on
such a policy would be faced with a question specifically reserved by the Supreme
Court in Runyon."° In such circumstances, scrutiny under the free exercise of
religion principles developed by the Supreme Court, as restated most recently in
Yoder, would be required.
Provided that the court in such a hypothetical § 1981 suit were to conclude
that the defendant's claim of religious motivation for his conduct was indeed
77 The conflict would also be avoided, of course, if a court concluded that § 1981 simply
did not apply to the discrimination or issue. In Runyon, for example, the Court intimated that
if the exclusion was based upon the religion of the applicant rather than his race, § 1981
would not apply. The statute, according to the Court, "is in no way addressed to such cate-
gories of selectivity." 427 U.S. at 167. See note 5 supra. Perhaps a similar analysis would
be appropriate in the case of a private school which, because of its religious belief, discrim-
inates among applicants on the basis of race. Justice Powell, concurring in Runyon, stressed
the fact that the private schools involved there advertised to the general public and Were
organized as commercial entities. Id. at 188. In his view, § 1981 would not reach discrimina-
tory actions that "are not part of a commercial relationship offered generally or widely, and
that reflect the selectivity exercised by an individual entering into a personal relationship."
Id. at 189. If a private school racially discriminated out of religious belief, but was small, non-
commercial, and did not generally make admission available to the public-at-large, it is conceiv-
able that the exclusion would fall within this category established by Justice Powell. Then,
perhaps the conduct would be shielded from the application of § 1981. A court which
decided that such a school was beyond the reach of the statute would thus be spared the neces-
sity of a first amendment inquiry. If the school were at all similar to those involved in
Runyon, however, it is doubtful that such a disposition would be appropriate. The mere fact
that the racial discrimination was rooted in religious belief would not transform the intended
contract into a "personal relationship." In such circumstances, a court would, it seems, be
forced to confront the first amendment question.
78 288 F. Supp. at 443.
79 A recent law review note dealt with the attempt by the Internal Revenue Service to
revoke the tax-exempt status of a college which practiced racial discrimination because of a
belief that such a policy was endorsed by the Bible. The article concluded with the sugges-
tion that the governmental policy should prevail over the school's first amendment defense in
order to avoid the spread of "contrived religious rationales as a haven from established federal
policy." Note, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1629, 1642-43 (1973). Under an analysis similar to that
employed in Kuch, if a claim were truly "contrived" the court would so decide in the course
of the preliminary inquiry and thus would never reach the constitutional question.
80 See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
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legitimate, it would be forced to examine the governmental interest furthered by
the statute. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in both Runyon and Jones,
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which § 1981 derives, was an exercise of
Congressional power under the thirteenth amendment. Congress was authorized
in utilizing this power to determine the badges and incidents of the slavery out-
lawed by the thirteenth amendment and to attempt to eradicate such evils.
81
This attempt to impart substance to a constitutional guarantee serves a compel-
ling federal interest.8 2 As the Court concluded in Jones:
At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under
the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white
man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress
cannot say that being a free man means at least this much, then the
Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation cannot keep.
3
In Runyon the Court found these general governmental concerns specifically
applicable to discrimination in the formation of contracts with a private school
for the education of a child. The Court analyzed the unsuccessful attempt by the
parents involved to enroll their children, and concluded that the practice of
"racial exclusion ... amounts to a classic violation of § 19812" ' In other words,
the conduct, the effect of which was no different than if it had been performed
by a school which based its policy on religious grounds, was within the reach of
Congressional power under the thirteenth amendment.8"
These passages indicate that a court, in scrutinizing § 1981 to determine if
a free exercise of religion claim should prevent the application of the law, would
find the presence of a strong government interest. Congress has determined,
pursuant to its power under the thirteenth amndment, that refusal to contract
with a person because of his race imposes a "badge" of slavery. Section 1981
provides a remedy for this discrimination. According to Runyon, it is a device
that can be used against a private school which discriminates among its applicants
on the basis of race. A constitutionally repugnant badge of slavery was imposed
on the rejected applicants in Runyon; it also results when the racial discrimina-
tion is grounded in religious belief. The stigma on the rejected family is the same
regardless of the motivation for the exclusionary policy. In both cases, the dollar
of one man is unable to purchase the same educational package as the dollar of
another, solely because of the race of the former. According to the rationale of
the Supreme Court, it was the desire to eradicate such discrimination that mo-
tivated Congress to enact § 1981.
81 392 U.S. at 440.
82 Id. at 433.
83 Id. at 443. The Court in Jones was speaking of the application of § 1982 to private
conduct. The discussion of the legislative history and the purposes served by the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 are, however, equally applicable to § 1981. See Part II, supra.
84 472 U.S. at 172.
85 Id. at 179. The Court in Runyon also pointed out that there is a close link between
"equality of opportunity to obtain an education and equality of employment opportunity." Id.
at 179 n.6. It concluded from the existence of this relationship that the application of § 1981
to racial discrimination in educational contracts advances the same social policies as the use of
the statute to deter discrimination in the area of contracts for private employment. Id. at 179.
Finally, citing Jones, the Runyon Court emphasized the closeness of the ideals fostered both by
this use of § 1981 and by "§ 1982's guarantee that 'a dollar in the hands of a Negro will pur-
chase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man.' "Id., quoting 392 U.S. at 443.
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However strong this federal policy might be, the fundamental nature of first
amendment freedom requires that, when possible, government policies must be
implemented in a manner that does not abridge this basic liberty."6 In a § 1981
case, a court would have to ask if the principles underlying the statute could be
effectuated in a less restrictive fashion than by the award of compensatory and
injunctive relief against the private school."
The availability of equivalent, or even superior, alternative educational op-
portunities is not dispositive of this inquiry. Entry of a rejected child into some
other school is not a valid less restrictive alternative. The disappointed applicant
may be assuaged by the knowledge that he may turn elsewhere, and perhaps a
court faced with a legitimate free exercise of religion defense would in such
circumstances decline to grant injunctive relief to the plaintiff. This is more of an
expedient compromise, however, than an acceptable alternative means of imple-
menting the statutory policy. The imposition of the stigma, the demonstration
of the continued vitality of a practice that is a "relic of slavery""8 occurs at the
time of the discriminatory refusal to contract. The plaintiff is deprived of an
opportunity, which he obviously desired to pursue, solely because of his race. To
direct the plaintiff's attention to another school where he will be fairly treated
does not effectuate the government's policy of eliminating such conduct.
Examination of the existence of less restrictive alternatives by which to
achieve the goals of § 1981 reveals an aspect of this issue that is not always
present in free exercise cases. In the hypothetical § 1981 suit, the practice for
which constitutional protection is claimed involves more than the religious
adherents: the rights of third parties, the excluded children and their parents,
are bound up in the controversy. While in Yoder the religious exercise affected
only the Amish families, in the hypothetical § 1981 suit the practice operates as
a direct affront to others. As seen in the previous paragraph, this fact makes the
search for a less restrictive alternative particularly difficult. The policy behind the
law is to deter individual acts of private discrimination. It is difficult to advance
that purpose without directly addressing the exclusionary action.
Of course, the involvement of the rights of third parties also colors any
inquiry into the effect of allowing an exemption from the law in favor of the
religious group. Yoder mandated an investigation of this possibility in free ex-
ercise cases. 9 There the court was able to conclude that the policy underlying the
compulsory education statute would not be thwarted by granting an exemption to
the Amish. Their life-style served as an alternative means of protecting the same
societal interests."
In the hypothetical § 1981 case, however, extending an exemption to the
defendants out of deference to their constitutional claim allows continuation of
the practice which directly undermines the governmental interest fostered by §
1981. The state interest in Yoder, although strong, was general; neither this
interest nor innocent third parties were injured by the allowance of the exemp-
86 See the earlier discussion of Sherbert and Yoder in Part III, suprM
87 This was the relief granted in Runyon. 427 U.S. at 165-66.
88 392 U.S. at 443.
89 406 U.S. at 221.
90 See note 67 supra and the accompanying text.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
tion. In the case of private schools which racially discriminate, however, the con-
sequences of such an action are simple and direct: the rejected applicant would
remain uncompensated for his loss2 The involvement of innocent third parties
thus adds weight to the government interest involved. Section 1981 embodies
more than an abstract concept of the public good; it is directly protective of
individual dignity.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the first amendment claimants may
also be sincere individuals. In these circumstances, granting relief to a § 1981
plaintiff would operate as a direct abridgement of the exercise of deeply held
religious beliefs. Many Americans would contest the validity of the doctrine that
segregation of the races is divinely ordained. Others, citing with suspicion the
long history of attempts to subvert the process of school desegregation, would
question the sincerity of any such free exercise of religion claim.92 If, however,
the belief is sincerely held, action by the state to curtail conduct based on this
belief is no less frustrative of personal liberty simply because the belief is un-
popular. The first amendment attempts to protect against these government
intrusions into areas of intense personal importance.
The case of Bob Jones University v. Johnson93 demonstrates that there are
groups which, as a matter of genuine religious principle, operate schools with a
racially discriminatory admissions policy. This 1974 case did not involve a §
1981 claim, but rather concerned the termination by the Veterans Administra-
tion of benefits paid to veterans attending Bob Jones. This action was based
upon the portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which forbids racial discrimina-
tion in programs receiving federal funding."
Bob Jones' policy with regard to admissions was to exclude unmarried, non-
white students. The university, described by the court as a "fundamentalistic
religious school," 95 insisted that this practice was prompted by deeply held
religious convictions. In the words of the court: "The policy is based on the
belief that segregation of the races is mandated by God, and that the integration
of the student body would lead to interracial marriage thereby violating God's
command."9 Because of this religious basis for its actions, the school claimed
that withdrawal of benefits would violate the free exercise of religion clause of
the first amendment.9 7
The court rejected this contention. First it repeated the familiar statement
that the existence of a compelling state interest as the foundation for a particular
91 The Supreme Court has recognized that the involvement of third parties is a factor to
be taken into consideration in any evaluation of free exercise of religion claims. In Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court held unconstitutional the attempt by
a state to compel schoolchildren to act contrary to their religious beliefs by saluting the flag
and pledging allegiance to it. Id. at 628-29, 642. One of the factors in the Court's decision
was that "[T]he freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with
rights asserted by any other individual." Id. at 630.
92 See text accompanying note 74, supra. The ability of a court to decide whether particu-
lar conduct was motivated by religious belief or by mere secular considerations would seem
sufficient to screen out spurious claims to constitutional protection.
93 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974).
94 Id. at 598-99.
95 Id. at 600.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 607.
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law can serve to override the right to freely exercise one's religious beliefs. Ex-
amining the interest which would be furthered by the government action at issue
here, the court stated that, "The national policy against race discrimination as
reflected in our body of laws is one such interest 'of the highest order'."98 The
district judge continued by quoting from another case in which a federal court
had held that when this interest is involved, it "is dominant over other constitu-
tional interests to the extent that there is complete and unavoidable conflict."9 9
The court in Bob Jones made two comments which serve both to differenti-
ate that case from the hypothetical § 1981 suit and to illustrate the harshness of
a decision in such a suit in favor of the rejected applicants. The district judge in
Bob Jones backed away from the strong statements, cited above, by concluding
that there really was no "direct challenge" made by the government against the
religious practice.' In other words, the university would lose its eligibility to
participate in the program, but would be perfectly free to continue its exclusion-
ary admissions policy in the future. In a Runyon-like § 1981 case, however, the
relief granted to the plaintiffs would constitute a "direct challenge" to the practice
for which constitutional protection is claimed. The defendant in such a suit
might well find itself enjoined by a court from continuing to exercise its beliefs.
It would be difficult to imagine a more direct abridgement of the freedom to
exercise religious beliefs.
The court in Bob Jones also noted that while private discrimination was the
operative fact which motivated the statutorily mandated withdrawal of eligibility,
one aspect of the case did involve the federal government's responsibility to avoid
indirect support of racial discrimination. The court did not have to decide the
case on this point, since it concluded that the statutory authority was sufficient to
prevail over the university. It intimated, however, that government "acquies-
cence" in discrimination carried on by participants in federal programs might
well violate the fifth amendment.'0
Unlike Bob Jones, a § 1981 case involving a rejected applicant and the
discriminating school involves only two private parties. The federal government
presumably will have played no role in the discrimination practiced by the school.
The desire to avoid a situation whereby the government appeared to be sup-
porting racial discrimination thus would not be a factor in the disposition of the
claim. In light of the involvement of the federal government in such a wide
range of activities, the need to avoid any hint of official sanction for discrimi-
nation is obvious. One of the fundamental principles of American life is that
minorities must be protected from abuses of power on the part of the majority.
In a § 1981 case pitting a racial minority against a religious minority, however,
this policy does not come into play.
In such litigation, the plaintiff would bring suit under a statute designed to
effectuate the broad guarantees of the thirteenth amendment. The defendant
would claim that application of the statute would violate the freedom secured by
98 Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215).
99 Id. at 608 (quoting Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1167 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd
mem. sub. nom. Colt v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971)).
100 396 F. Supp. at 607.
101 Id. at 608.
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the first amendment. A federal court would of necessity be involved, in order
to decide which interest will prevail. This involvement is much different from
conduct, occurring at the time of the discriminatory act, which could be in-
terpreted as government support of that discrimination. The hypothetical § 1981
case is not one in which the majority is using its power in a manner potentially
destructive of the rights of a particular minority. Thus, while Bob Jones provides
an example of a school which does in fact racially discriminate out of a sincerely
held religious belief, and thus helps to make the inquiry concrete, it cannot serve
as direct authority for a decision that the plaintiffs in a § 1981 suit would prevail.
Different considerations exist in the instant case, which seem to demonstrate that
the conflict is more basic and more difficult to resolve than that in Bob Jones.
V. Conclusion
If an applicant for admission to a private school were rejected, because of
his race, by school authorities whose actions were rooted in religious beliefs, the
scene would be set for a confrontation between fundamental principles. A § 1981
suit based upon these facts would pit a plaintiff, whose action is based upon a
statutory implementation of thirteenth amendment freedom, against a defendant
who claims the protection of the free exercise of religion guarantee of the first
amendment. One of the dominant themes of modern American society has been
the attempt to eradicate racial discrimination, to secure the equality which has
eluded so many people for so long. On the other hand, Americans have long
cherished the freedom to espouse a wide variety of religious beliefs and to act in
a manner consistent with these views. Government action that directly restrains
the exercise of such beliefs has in the past been countenanced by the courts only
after careful scrutiny of the state interests allegedly served by such a restraint. A
court involved in this suit would be obliged to resolve a direct conflict between
these vital interests by means of the same sort of painstaking analysis. No matter
which interest prevails, the result will be somewhat disquieting, since with it will
come the knowledge that, while one person's freedom has been vindicated,
another's has been abridged.0 2
Mark McLaughlin
102 The district judge in Bob Jones commented that as a result of that litigation, "freedom
was sent to the guillotine in the name of freedom." Id. at 599.
[October 1977]
